GERMANIC MOVEMENT THEORIES

            The movements and/or invasions of the Germanic tribes have long been discussed with many explanatory theories, generally ignoring climate change, offered in explanation.  These theories have generally pushed climate out of the realm of acceptable connectedness.  The traditional historical perspectives have tended to focus on the decline of the Roman Empire, not necessarily why the Germanic tribes moved.  They view Germanic invasions as little more than an inconvenience or annoyance to the Emperors (the families Severan, Syrian, or Illyrian) who were busy trying and or failing to hold the Empire together (Gibbon and Womersley, 1994) .  Little attention is paid to the Germanic tribes as if they are insignificant “barbarians” who simply had nothing better to do than to disrupt the Roman Empire. 

            Often called a “the Troubled Century”, the third century AD is arguably the beginning of the end of the Western Roman Empire with a reprieve brought about by a few strong Caesars including Diocletian and Constantine (Scarre, 1995) .  There appears to have been a string of ‘weak’ and inept Emperors who attempt to hold off Germanic invasions/ incursions along the Rhine and Danube frontiers (Gibbon and Womersley, 1994) .  Invasions of the Persians from Artabanus V and Shapur I (Gibbon and Womersley, 1994) , the rise of Postumus in Gallia (Alflödy, 1974) , and the defeat and deaths of Emperors Valerian and Decius (Todd, 1992) are among the many troubles of the Roman Empire during the third century AD (Grant, 1999) . 

            The historic interpretations of the weakening of the Roman Empire are quite widely accepted and are probably representative of this period of Roman history.  Among the many issues that are associated with the third century AD are the transformation of the monarchy (Gibbon and Womersley, 1994) , instability of the state (Gibbon and Womersley, 1994) , increasing power and importance of the army (Alflödy, 1974) , predominance of the provinces (Grant, 1999) , social change (Scarre, 1995) , economic problems (Alflödy, 1974) , a decrease in population (Boack, 1955) , religious and moral crises (Frend, 1984) , and usually listed lastly, the barbarian invasions (Hodgkin, 1880) .  Among the reasons for the barbarian invasions, sometimes called migrations by revisionists historians, are population increases, food shortages, domino effects of the stronger tribes, jealousy of the Roman lifestyle, anger of the border tribes, and usually unlisted entirely is climate change (Alflödy, 1974, Bradley, 1888, Musset, 1975, Wolfram, 1997) .

            Much attention has been paid to the failing infrastructure of the Roman Empire as the principal reason for the success of the Germanic tribes.  The reasoning behind this is that the newly developing weaknesses of the Roman Empire allows successes of the Germanic tribes to break through the Danube and Rhine limes.  There were aggressions along the limes before the eventual failure of this protective line in the AD 254, but they were not very successful (Musset, 1975) .

            The change of the Roman Emperors’ ability to control the Senate and the realm, sometimes referred to as the “weak” Emperors, changed the basic balances of power between the Emperor and the Senate, thereby reducing the strength and response of the Empire as a whole (Gibbon and Womersley, 1994) .  This general instability of the state distracted the central power of Rome.  The frequent assassinations of the Caesars severely weakened the power of Rome (Alflödy, 1974) .  Even Saint Cyprian noted that it was the general opinion of the populous that the collapse of the Roman Empire was at hand (Cyprian, Letters, 3) (Cyprian and Donna, 1965) .

            Also during this period, the real power shifts to the army, mostly due to the short lived reigns of the Caesars during the third century AD.  The army slowly becomes dominant over the senate.  They had become corrupt and undisciplined and avaricious (Alflödy, 1974) .  The army became especially important to Caesar Severus, who stationed a legion just 20 miles outside of Rome to intimidate and reduce the power of the Senate (Scarre, 1995) .

            This change in power, or focus of interest, allowed several provinces to increase their own self-importance such as Gallia and the losses of Dacia and Agri Decumates (Gibbon and Womersley, 1994, Alflödy, 1974, Scarre, 1995) .  This was only partially recovered toward the end of the third century with the re-incorporation of Gallia, but the other provinces remain outside the Empire (Gibbon and Womersley, 1994) .  It has been argued that the crisis of the third century did not begin with the migrations of people, but from the transition from the old administrative system to the new (Alflödy, 1974) .

            The economic system of the Roman Empire also declined greatly through the third century, continuing its downward spiral from the second century AD (Scarre, 1995) .  This is most evident in the comparison of the silver content of Roman coinage, which drops from over 70% in AD 190 to about 39% in AD 215 and diminishes further from AD 250 to 270 leveling at only 3% (Scarre, 1995, Gibbon and Womersley, 1994) (Figure 3.1).  This was not the case in central Europe where the broadly-based subsistence economy was relatively stable (Wells, 1999) .  This depreciation in value of currency was exacerbated by the apparent decrease in population of the Roman Empire.  Ulpian, Cyprian, and Dionysius of Alexandria all documented declines in population and it has been inferred that several other Imperial provinces also decreased in population (Boack, 1955, Alflödy, 1974) .

            The transition to interests in the Mystery Cults of the Orient and their deities, Isis, Cybele, and Mithras, the new prominence of Christianity, the worship of Sol Invictus (Unconquered Sun) changed the religious focus of Rome (Hazlett and Frend, 1991, Frend, 1984, Alflödy, 1974) .  Even Tertullian, a third century church official, pointed out that Rome would naturally fall one day, and at the present time they were in a time in which concutitur imperium “a disturbance in the leadership” prevailed (Tertullian, Apologeticus,87).  The church viewed this period as a time of moral crisis (Alflödy, 1974) .  Rome was disintegrating and this is believed to be the reason for the success of the Germanic invasions during the third century.

            The Germanic tribes are generally believed to have been envying the Roman Empire, because it was a land of unimaginable riches and they were full of amazement and greed (Thompson, 1982) .  This argument and many similar ones together with the problems of the Roman Empire may explain why the Germanic tribes succeeded at crossing the limes.

            Some have suggested that the invaders were not the bulk of the Germanic warriors but bands of “warrior clubs” or smaller groups only interested in looting and adventure (Price, 1996, Musset, 1975) .  But, as so eloquently stated by Patrick Perin, “the irreversible movements of Barbarian peoples which gained momentum from the end of the third century are known as the “Great Invasions”, or as the more subtly-veiled terminology of the Anglo-Saxon and German historian would have it, the “Great Migrations” (Perin, 1993) .  This idea was already prevalent with Herwig Wolfram when he wrote that it was a mistake by revisionist historians to call the invasions a migration (Wolfram, 1988) .  This is easily defendable, because the Germanic tribes did cross the limes into Roman territory, which by any definition is an invasion; however, there were peaceful crossings and co-inhabitation of Germans and Romans in the same area at the same time, but the discourse on this aspect if for a later chapter (AP, 1999) .

            One of the more common explanations for the motivation of the Germanic tribes, beyond the internal decay of the Roman Empire, is the Domino Effect.  This theory has its roots on the Russian Steppes with the Huns pushing the Alans toward the Goths and thus the rest of the Germanic tribes into Roman territory from the 1^st century to the 4^th century AD (Musset, 1965) .  This is actually a newer idea than that of Henry Bradley who in 1888 pointed out that the Goths were not driven from their homelands as evident by the fact that weaker tribes, the Lithuanians and Slavs, took the land after it was abandoned (Bradley, 1888) .  Bradley further suggested that the movement was actually due to an increase in population, which may have been combined with either crop failure or an outbreak of pestilence (Bradley, 1888) .  This increase in population in Germania is exceptionally intriguing because documentation of the Roman provinces records a decrease in population.

            Evidence from the archaeological record suggests that the fall of Agri Decumates was a slow, gradual process of cross-border interactions and of frequent small-scale incursions that lasted for decades, eventually removing the region from Roman control (Wells, 1999) .  Wells states that many areas, especially in the 4^th century AD, transformed over a long and gradual process from Roman dominance to tribal governance through interaction with and migration by peoples across the frontier (Wells, 1999) .

            Whether the cause of the invasions/ migrations is due to relations between Germanic tribes and the Roman army, deterioration of the Roman Empire, or the Domino Effect, there is one consistency in contemporary interpretation – oversimplification.   There appears to be a trend that assigns characteristics of one tribe to several others (Green, 1995) .  This period is indeed a “troubled century”, but the reasoning behind the invasion/ migration of the Germanic tribes is not made easier by simply claiming a faltering Roman Empire.

            Climate as a possible constituent of migration may have been suggested as early as 1907.  Ellsworth Huntington hypothesized that a massive climate change that affected central Europe and the Steppes of Russia must have been one of the main reasons that the migrations/ invasions in the region were so widespread and inclusive (Huntington, 1907) .  This idea was based solely in speculation with little or no scientific data.  He hypothesized that movements of this magnitude would be indicative of a large climate change (Huntington et al., 1914) .

            The theories that have been developed over the twentieth century concerning climate influences on human activity are extensive.  These general studies include C. E. P. Brooks’ Climate through the ages: a study of the climatic factors and their variations (1949 and 1970), William Henry Matthews, William W. Kellogg and G. D. Robertson’s, Man's impact on the climate (1971), H. H. Lamb’s Climate history and the future (1977), Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb’s Climate and history: studies in interdisciplinary history (1981), H. H. Lamb’s Climate history and the modern world (1981), T. M. L. Wigley and M. J. Farmer’s Climate and history: studies in past climates and their impact on man (1981), and K. M. Clayton’s Climate, climatic change and rates of denudation (1983).

            Other studies have focused on agricultural and economic productivity and the affects of changing climate.  These include Martin L. Parry’s Climatic change, agriculture, and settlement (1978), J. L. Anderson’s History and climate: some economic models (1981), Martin L. Parry’s Climate change and the agricultural frontier (1981), and J. C. Ritchie’s Climate change and vegetation response (1986).  These studies are directly concerned with climate change and its effects on agricultural production, which in turn affects human indirectly.

            Some of these studies have used historical records to help reconstruct climate by using documented climate events in comparison to their proxies to validate their theories.  These studies include David Herlihy’s Climate and documentary sources: a comment (1981), Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie’s Times of feast, times of famine: a history of climate since 1000 (1988), Joel Guiot’s The combination of historical documents and biological date in the reconstruction of climate variations in space and time (1992), Edward Linacre’s Climate data and resources: a reference and guide (1992), Helge Salvesen’s The climate as a factor of historical causation (1992), and Margarita Chernavskaya’s The climate of the Russian Plain according to the diary of Peter the Great, and the weather records of Czar Aleksey’s court: climate trends and anomalies in Europe 1675-1715 (1997).  While other studies have used climate change to interpret the responses of humans to the environment.  These studies include Edwin Darnell Slatter’s Drought and demographic change in the prehistoric southwest United States: a preliminary quantitative assessment (1979), Martyn J. Bowden and Robert W. Kates’ The effects of climate fluctuations on human populations: two hypotheses (1981), Brent D. Shaw’s Climate, environment, and history: the case of Roman impact on man (1981), Donald Sutherland’s Weather and the peasantry of upper Brittany, 1780-1789 (1981), Hermann Flohn and Roberto Fantechi’s The climate of Europe: past, present and future: natural and man-induced climatic changes: a European perspective (1984), Anja Heide’s Das Wetter und Klima in der rominschen inm Westen des Reiches: The Weather and Climate in the Western Roman Empire (1997), David W. Stahle et al.’s The Lost Colonies and Jamestown droughts (1998), and Peter B. DeMenocal’s Cultural responses to climate change during the Late Holocene (2001).

Studies of climate changes and their subsequent influences on humans are in no way unique or new as evident from the previous discussion.  So, why have scholars apparently neglected climate influence on human activity in the third century AD if there have been so many other times where climate may have had significant influence?  The answer lies in two areas: one, high-resolution climate data was not available and second, there has been a lack of communication between the historians/ archaeologists and the paleoclimatologists.  The data that are readily available include palynology, which does yield annual resolution data sets, and dendrochronology, which is the best method of paleoclimatological reconstruction. Other proxies are also helpful in piecing the puzzle together.